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Abstract-A lot of discussions for smart card based identification and digital signature schemes 
have been considered in the literature. In this paper, a novel approach is proposed for smart cards to 
perform signature validation and identification verification efficiently with the help of the powerful 
signature signer and the identity prover. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are a lot of interactive identification and digital signature schemes suitable for smart card 
applications have been developed based upon modern public key cryptographic technology. In 
public key systems, we usually need to hold some large integers as the secret key and system infor- 
mation. To deal with such conditions, smart card based systems are developed to meet practical 
applications, especially for the personal usages, because smart card has its own computational 
unit and memory. But smart cards have limited computational power under the considerations of 
technologies or even economics. A computational model called the server-aided secret com- 
putation (SASC) has been proposed by Matsumoto et al. [l] which uses an untrusted powerful 
auxiliary device, the server, to help a smart card, the client, to compute a secret function effi- 
ciently. Since then, some protocol designs, performance analysis, and cryptanalysis of such kind 
of client-server computation have been considered [l-6]. In this paper, a new client-server based 
computational model called the server-aided honest computation (SAHC) is proposed to 
develop high speed smart card based digital signature validation and identity proof verification 
based upon some famous systems [7-lo]. 
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
There are some fundamental differences between the SAHC and the SASC computations. In 
the SASC protocol, the client (i.e., the smart card) wishes to perform a function 
F(M, 4 (1) 
where F( ) and M are public, while the number d is the client’s secret, with the aid of the 
untrusted powerful server. Besides efficiency demand, the key point is the security requirement 
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of not to reveal the secret number d to the server with very large probability. The strict security 
requirement comes from the fact that the server can employ his huge computational power to 
extract out the secret number d in an off-line manner later on. 
In the proposed SAHC protocol, the client wishes to perform a function 
G(a, Y), (2) 
where all the G( ), cr, and y are public, and to check the correctness of a relationship between 
y and G(cr, y) with the aid of the untrusted powerful server (i.e., the identity prover or the 
signature signer). Besides efficiency demand, the key point is the guarantee requirement of 
correctness of the relationship with very large probability. Security/correctness requirement and 
probability requirement are basically where the SASC and SAHC differ. Since there is no 
personal secret parameter existing and the server must respond in real-time, probability demand 
is not so critical as in the SASC protocol. Without any loss of generality, the proposed SAHC 
protocol is illustrated by the Schnorr’s digital signature scheme in this paper. A similar design 
strategy can be applied to the other schemes [7-lo] easily. 
3. SERVER-AIDED HONEST COMPUTATION FOR THE 
SCHNORR’S SIGNATURE SCHEME 
In the following protocol, the phase-l and phase-3 are the same as the original Schnorr’s 
signature scheme and the SAHC algorithm is employed in the phase-2. In this system, each 
userichoosesarandomnumberSiE{1,2,...,q-l}, where q is a prime and larger than 2140, 
as his secret key and computes Ki 3 cumsa (mod P) as the public key. 
SIGNATURE GENERATION AND VALIDATION PROTOCOL. 
(phase-l signature generation) 
l-l The signer (i.e., the server) A chooses a random number r E {1,2,. . . , q- 1) and computes 
X E ar(mod P). 
l-2 A number e is evaluated as e = h(X, M) where h( ) is a cryptographic one-way hashing 
function and M is the message to be signed. 
l-3 The signer A then finds the integer y such that y E r-t S, x e(mod q) and sends {M, (e, y)} 
as the message and signature pair to the receiver (i.e., the smart card holder), user B. 
(phase-2 server-aided honest computation) 
2-l 
2-2 
The receiver B randomly divides the received integer y into a public integer vector Y = 
(Yl,Y2r*** , ym) and a secret binary vector F = (fl, f2, . . . , fm), with Hamming weight 
W(F) = ~51, such that 
Y = 2 fi x yi(modq). (3) 
i=l 
The receiver B also randomly divides the received integer e into a public integer vector 
E= (el,eQ,... , e,) and a secret binary vector G = (91, g2,. . . , gm), with Hamming weight 
W(G) = Ls, such that 
e-u+ 2 si x ei(mod 4, (4 
i=l 
where the integer u is known only to the client B. The client B then sends Y and E to 
the signer A (the server). 
The signer A computes and returns the vector V = (vi = cP*(modP), i = 1,. . . , m) and 
W = (wi = Kz*(mod P), i = 1,. . . , m) to the client B. 
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2-3 The client B computes an integer X’ from V, W, F, and G as 
X’= (zl$‘) x (&!ix$$‘) (modP) 
s cxJ”x Ka(mod P), 
where K,“(mod P) must be on-line computed. 
(5) 
(phase-3 signature validation) 
3-l Finally, an integer h(X’, M) is evaluated and the client B checks if eLh(X’, M). If the 
condition is satisfied, the client B accepts the signature {M, (e, y)} of M signed by the 
server A, otherwise the signature is rejected. 
4. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
It must be emphasized that the proposed SAHC protocol is used particularly for the real- 
time cryptographic applications, e.g., the interactive identification and digital signature where 
the smart card (the client) is either the identification verifier or the signature receiver. In such 
real-time applications, reasonable probability of 2-2o(x 10m6) can be acceptable such that the 
cheater has only the probability of 10m6 to pass through the real-time protocol. 
In the above signature protocol, the dishonest signer A may wish to cheat/attack the receiver 
B by the following two approaches: 
attack-l 
attack-2 
the signer A may give a wrong signature (e, y’) to the receiver B in the phase-l and 
returns the correct integer G(modP) to the receiver in the phase-2, 
the signer A may also send a wrong signature (e, y”) according to the following equa- 
tion 
y” = T + Sl x e(mod q) (6) 
to the receiver B in the phase-l and returns the related integers o?“(mod P) and 
modP) to the receiver B in the phase-2. 
In the above two attacks, the receiver (the client) will accept {M, (e, y’)} or {M, (e, y”)} as the 
valid signature for message M signed by the signer A. 
The SAHC algorithm is developed to overcome the above attacks. For the evaluation of (~9 
and K;, the following implementation can be feasible: 
(1) the parameters L1 = 5, LZ = 5, and m = 50, 
(2) the integer u is selected to be a random number in (0, 1, . . . , 21g - 1). More detailed 
analysis shows that the above implementation meets the requirement of probability 10m6. 
Under the above parameter selection, it takes only 4 on-line multiplications to obtain &(mod P) 
and 31 (on the average) or 40 (at most) multiplications to obtain Ki(modP) using the famous 
square-multiply exponentiation evaluation algorithm [ll]. Without the SAHC algorithm, the 
client needs on the average 210 and 108 multiplications to evaluate aY(mod P) and Kz(mod P) 
respectively. This SAHC algorithm saves a lot of computations for the client in this scheme 
and can be even more efficient to perform signature validation and identity proof verification of 
schemes in [8-lo]. Using the SAHC protocol, in some multiple-round applications with the same 
server A, the evaluation of Kz(mod P) can be improved by repeatedly using of Kz(mod P) and 
randomly partitioning of y and e. As for the server’s performance, the algorithm can be further 
improved if the vectors Y and E contain only a large integer in the domain of q and some other 
smaller random integers. Furthermore, for practical implementation, the vectors Y and E can 
be identical. Other special implementations of vectors Y and E, e.g., the addition sequence [ll], 
are also possible to improve the server’s performance. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Recently, smart card based digital signature and personal identification schemes using cryp- 
tographic technology are receiving more and more attentions. In this paper, we discuss the 
conditions that smart card holder wishes to verify the validation of identification and/or digital 
signature generated from a prover and/or signer with powerful computing machine efficiently. 
Server-aided honest computation protocol is proposed to meet the requirement of the above envi- 
ronment. Through the protocol, the signer and/or identity prover must follow the exact protocol 
steps honestly otherwise, the smart card holder can detect the dishonesty efficiently and reject 
the signer and/or prover. 
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